Australia is unique for the oligopolistic power of just two supermarkets. Coles and Woolworths have 80% market share of an industry valued at A$80+ billion.

In the UK, the two major chains Tesco and Sainsbury have 48% and the US equivalent is just 20%. Consequently when our retailers brought in management from the UK to apply the successful Private Label model developed by Tesco and Asda they did so with the potential to have a significantly bigger impact on our market overall.

Private label is no longer cheap generic Black & Gold commodity lines, it's the key to the retailers growing profit at the expense of both brands and producers. Whether you are in the FMCG business or a service business, the Private Label strategy is one that threatens every business as the company with the most customer data gains ownership of the sales process.

Global FMCG brands now struggle to turn a profit in Australia

In the last year major FMCG brand owners like Unilever and Nestle have publicly lamented their lack of power in this country to compete with the oligopoly's own brand agenda. While we have more supermarkets per capita than the US and nearly 3 times as many as the UK, the 10,000 Australian independents have so little share and such disparate distribution requirements for fulfilment they offer brands little scope for profitable scale.

Most shoppers don't realise they're being had

The trend to consumer demand for more brand choice and gourmet choices is being matched by Woolworths by it's purchase of Macro Wholefoods and roll out of Thomas Dux stores. Not only have Woolies out-merchandised the Harris Farm model, they've done an even better job in wine.

Together, Coles and Woolworths have over 50% of the liquor market, not just through retail store brands like Dan Murphys, Liquorland, 1st Choice, Porters, Theos and Vintage Cellars, but the big online database driven direct marketers like Cellarmasters and Langtons. Here is how Choice sees it:

This dominance has enabled the two majors to dictate what brands you can buy. They have delisted most small vineyards and substituted them with a cynical excercise in facadism. There is a plethora of over 240 Private Labels masquerading as boutique wines giving the impression of choice. They are merely made-up attractive wine labels stuck on bottles of mass produced vin ordinaire. From Abbey View to Willowbrook, see the list of fake wine brands for yourself.

Now they are using their data Intelligence to segment and market everything from Private Label credit cards to health insurance. For instance, they use loyalty card tracking of grocery purchases and the knowledge that if you eat red meat you are a better actuarial risk to target the insurance sales process. What insurance company can compete with this big brother view of Australians?

How does a business compete with this onslaught? A study by international branding expert Professor Mark Ritson of Melbourne Business School gives some insight...

The formula for Private Label success

• Lack of perceived differentiation between brands in a category

• Lack of value innovation of incumbent brands

• Increased proportion of price promotion activity

• Available production capacity

• For me products

• Smart retailers

• Competitive retailers

• Concentrated retailers

The power of the retailers in this market allows them to demand more price promotion from brands, which leaves little in their budgets for brand building marketing campaigns or new product innovation. In no time the brand values are hollowed out, leaving the category ripe for Private Label substitution.

The Seven stages of Private Label dominance

Stage 1: Price-based generics (Home Brand, Black and Gold etc)

Stage 2: Copycat (Penguin vs Puffin biscuits)

Australia has passed here and well into the next stage.

Stage 3: Good, Better, Best (Tesco Value, Tesco, Tesco Finest)

Stage 4: Flanker brands (brand extensions to attract brand 'switchers')

Stage 5: Category leaders (Sainsbury Extra Special Tea Bags)

Stage 6: Non exclusive (expanding beyond the store)

Stage 7: Legal monopoly

The supply side to killing brands

The no-name supplier is offered a carrot to become the stick that wacks the known brands.This business is often an existing maker of their own known brand line. Why would a Heinz for instance supply Woolies Private Label baked beans? This is what attracts them:

• Usually opportunistic origins
• Often based on excess capacity utilisation
• Any contribution over variable costs of production is seen by management as good
• Less profit... but still profit

Where it leads is usually not so positive. Here is what happens when the no-name supplier exceeds production capacity:

• Increased production costs for same or less profit
• Cannibalisation of existing branded product

Gradual strategic 'split':

• From brand builder to PL supplier
• Internal resources get utilised
• An implicit strategic change

Change of business from:

• Brand builder / innovator / consumer focus to
• PL supplier / cost cutter / business customer focus

Private Label and the weaker brands are consolidated:

• As PL grows weaker manufacturer shares decline
• Brand fights brand – not PL
• To maintain brand and shelf presence, 'lesser' products become 'propped' up with disproportionate costs
• Resources become further diluted
• Finally, once mighty brands are de-listed by the duopoly
• The retailer approaches a new potential supplier for PL, and so it all repeats

How high can Private Label go? (How low will brands fall?)

Private Label share in Australia today
23% is current floor

The UK is in the middle
50% Private Label

Theoretical ceiling
95% of product in Aldi is Private Label